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PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND GEORGIA: 
RED, WHITE, AND BLUE OR JUST RED AND 
BLUE? 
M. Christopher Freeman, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1811, the recently elected Massachusetts Governor Elbridge 
Gerry approved a plan to redraw electoral districts in favor of the 
Democratic-Republican Party over the opposing Federalist Party.1 
However, the plan and the following year’s state senate election 
results resulted in considerable political and public opposition.2 
Although the popular vote was nearly split between the Democratic-
Republicans and the Federalists, the former won twenty-nine of the 
forty available seats: nearly seventy-five percent.3 One of the new 
districts created by the plan, Essex, became the center of criticism for 
its highly unusual and serpentine shape, weaving back and forth 
across county lines and splitting towns in two.4 Political cartoonists, 
leaping at the opportunity to further deride Governor Gerry’s 
redistricting plan, added talons, wings, eyes, and teeth to the Essex 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Professor Patrick 
Wiseman for your invaluable help, criticism, and patience with me and this Note from conception to 
publication. An additional thanks need also be given to all the editors of the Georgia State University 
Law Review for sacrificing their time and energy to better this Note and the Georgia State University 
Law Review. Finally, to my friends, family, and loved ones: thank you for your words of encouragement 
and endless support. 
 1. Greg Miller, The Map That Polarized the Word ‘Gerrymander,’ NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 28, 
2017), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/06/map-gerrymander-redistricting-history-newspaper/ 
[https://perma.cc/8FLN-UFTR]. 
 2. See Paul V. Niemeyer, The Gerrymander: A Journalistic Catch-Word of Constitutional 
Principle? The Case in Maryland, 54 MD. L. REV. 242, 251 (1995) (quoting Salem Gazette, Mar. 27, 
1812) (“Opponents attacked the plan almost from its inception. Even before its passage, newspapers 
described the plan as ‘cutting up counties and carving out districts.’”); Miller, supra note 1 (criticizing 
the plan as “an abomination to democracy”). 
 3. Miller, supra note 1. The Democratic-Republican Party won because Governor Gerry, a member 
of that party, needed to give Democratic-Republicans as many advantages as possible to secure his title 
and safeguard his party’s majority control, which it was just barely maintaining. Id. 
 4. Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 251. Prior to this election, Massachusetts state senators were elected 
to represent entire counties, so there was no need for district lines to zigzag between county lines. Id. 
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district map.5 The resulting “pre-historic monster” resembled a 
salamander and, so, was entitled “The Gerry-mander.”6 The name 
stuck and became a term inseparable from the political maneuvering 
that created it.7 
Partisan, or political, gerrymandering today retains its nineteenth-
century roots, continuing to purposefully divide areas into districts to 
give an advantage to one party.8 The pervasiveness of 
gerrymandering raises issues not just in swing states like Wisconsin 
but also in states dominated by a single party like Georgia.9 Despite 
the long history of opposition to partisan gerrymandering in district 
plans, it is not always unconstitutional or improper per se.10 The 
Constitution vests in Congress the power of apportionment of state 
legislative districts, but both the Constitution and Congress remain 
silent with respect to mid-decade redistricting.11 People and groups 
discriminatorily affected by heavily gerrymandered districts may still 
challenge the constitutionality of those apportionments under the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act.12 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. at 253; Miller, supra note 1. Elkanah Tisdale, an artist and Federalist, was the first to portray 
the “protean district” with all its monstrous features. Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 253. 
 6. Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 251–53 (published on March 26, 1812, in the Boston Gazette); Miller, 
supra note 1. 
 7. Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 253; Miller, supra note 1. 
 8. Political Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 72 (5th pocket ed. 2016); Niemeyer, 
supra note 2, at 249. 
 9. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853, 872, 944 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (referring to citizens of 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and other swing states who also recently filed suit over state redistricting 
plans), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); see also Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. 
Supp. 3d 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
 10. Brief of Bernard Grofman & Ronald Keith Gaddie as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party 
at 5, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) [hereinafter Brief of Bernard Grofman & 
Ronald Keith Gaddie]; Ethan Weiss, Comment, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Elusive Standard, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 697 (2013) (stating that certain amounts of politicking are acceptable so 
long as “legislatures adhere to traditional redistricting criteria”). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included in this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . . .”); 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 
109, 232–33 (1986). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . without due process of law; nor deny 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); 52 U.S.C.S. § 10301 (LEXIS 
through Pub. L. No. 115–60) (prohibiting apportionment schemes that reduce the voting strength of 
minorities); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (establishing that “an excessive 
injection of politics is unlawful”). 
2
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In hearing partisan gerrymandering claims, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has consistently struggled with several issues, 
especially when it comes to applying a standard to determine when a 
districting scheme is unconstitutional.13 Though many standards have 
not withstood the Court’s scrutiny, the Efficiency Gap (EG) is a 
measure that has overcome the failings of its predecessors.14 The EG 
is a central aspect of Gill v. Whitford, the Wisconsin gerrymandering 
case heard during the Supreme Court’s October 2017 Term.15 The 
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction and remanded the case for 
want of standing without explicitly ruling on the EG’s fitness as a 
judicially manageable measure for determining a plan’s 
discriminatory effect.16 Therefore, the Court left the door open for 
future litigants to potentially succeed in integrating the EG as one 
piece in a larger legal test for defining unconstitutional 
gerrymandering.17 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 132. A plurality of the Court held that a reapportionment plan’s 
discriminatory effect can be shown where an electoral scheme consistently degrades the plaintiff’s 
impact on the political process. Id. However, several dissenting Justices gave their own standard for 
showing discriminatory effect and unconstitutionality. Id. at 165. The dissent looked to factors like 
fairness, district shape, and adherence to established political subdivisions. Id. This divide continued in 
later court proceedings, particularly in Vieth when the Court rejected the decision in Davis altogether. 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287–88. 
 14. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284, 287, 301; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, 
Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015). Justice Scalia, 
writing for the plurality, rejected the plaintiff’s standard that required map drafters to act only with a 
predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage because it was too ambiguous. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284. 
Justice Scalia also believed the Court should not have to create a standard itself. Id. at 305–06. He 
therefore dismissed Justice Kennedy’s argument that a better claim could arise under the Fourteenth 
Amendment if it was possible to show how a permissible representation burdened the plaintiff’s rights. 
Id. at 306. 
 15. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018). 
 16. See id. at 1923. It should be noted how unusual it is for the Court, after finding plaintiffs lacked 
standing, to remand a case so that plaintiffs have a second attempt at proving standing. See id. at 1933–
34. Normally, the Court will “remand the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. 
at 1941 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 17. See id. at 1941 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Courts—and in particular this Court—will again be 
called on to redress extreme partisan gerrymanders. I am hopeful we will then step up to our 
responsibility to vindicate the Constitution against a contrary law.”); Eric McGhee, Symposium: The 
Efficiency Gap Is a Measure, Not a Test, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 11, 2017, 10:39 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-efficiency-gap-measure-not-test/ 
[https://perma.cc/9FV5-FHVU] (explaining that the EG primarily measures voting efficiency and should 
be incorporated in a larger test because “a good legal test will probably end up measuring more than one 
thing”). 
3
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This opening is of particular importance to Georgia’s most recent 
redistricting plan.18 Enacted in 2015, Georgia House Bill 566 shifted 
many district lines and incited public unrest and claims of 
unconstitutionality.19 In addition to the litigation already surrounding 
it,20 the mid-decennial redistricting was quickly followed by another 
plan in 2017.21 The EG may prove a useful measure in determining 
whether Georgia’s successive redistricting plans impose 
unconstitutional harm on the state’s voters. 
This Note will discuss the viability of the EG and its ramifications 
as part of a standard for evaluating the unconstitutionality of current 
and potential districting plans, particularly regarding Georgia’s 2015 
plan.22 Part I outlines the judicial history of partisan gerrymandering 
and also provides an overview of the EG’s mechanics and the 
development of Georgia’s reapportionment schemes.23 Part II then 
examines the EG’s strengths and weaknesses, applies it and other 
factors to Georgia’s current districting map, and analyzes the map’s 
constitutionality.24 Finally, Part III proposes changes to Georgia’s 
current plan that, through legislative conformity to specified 
standards, will ensure adherence to constitutional principles.25 
                                                                                                                 
 18. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
 19. Id. (revising the borders of seventeen districts); see also Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. 
Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ga. 2017); Bill Torpy, Torpy at Large: Democracy Divided 
Should Not Stand, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.myajc.com/news/local/torpy-large-democracy-divided-should-not-
stand/KaxFVEPXsuxkBGpUe7BpeK/ [https://perma.cc/Q7BW-H675] (describing state politics in 
Georgia as “electoral insanity”). 
 20. See generally NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1270. Plaintiffs filed suit against Georgia and the 
Secretary of State alleging, among other things, that House Bill 566 creates unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering. Id. 
 21. H.B. 515, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017). Although the house passed Bill 515 just 
three days after it was first introduced, the senate tabled it on March 28, 2017. Id. The Bill would have 
redrawn districts whose lines had just been changed two years earlier. Id. 
 22. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
 23. See infra Part I. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See infra Part III. 
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I.   Background 
The right to vote is one of the undeniable cornerstones of the 
Constitution.26 The First Amendment restricts federal encroachment 
on individuals’ freedom of association, which is also insulated from 
states’ intrusion under the Fourteenth Amendment.27 Moreover, “[n]o 
right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in 
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good 
citizens, they must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory 
if the right to vote is undermined.”28 Yet, for nearly as long as the 
right to vote has existed, gerrymandering has infringed upon it.29 
A.   How Gerrymandering Works 
One of the few aspects of partisan gerrymandering courts and legal 
scholars can agree on is its definition: “[t]he practice of dividing a 
geographic area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular 
shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the 
opposition’s voting strength.”30 This frequently leads to 
counterintuitive election results.31 For instance, as illustrated in Table 
1 below, assume that a state with three electoral districts has two 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). The Court upheld the district court’s actions in 
ordering a reapportionment of both houses of the state legislature because, “[u]ndoubtedly, the right of 
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.” Id. 
 27. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968). Justice Black commented: 
In the present situation[,] the state laws place burdens on two different, although 
overlapping, kinds of rights—the right of individuals to associate for the 
advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of 
their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of 
course, rank among our most precious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that 
freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment. And of course this 
freedom protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is 
entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from 
infringement by the States. 
Id. 
 28. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)). 
 29. See Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 249 (noting that “[t]he practice of drawing district lines to 
commandeer elections has existed in America since the colonial period”). 
 30. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (2004); Political Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016). 
 31. See Weiss, supra note 10, at 696 (commenting on how, because of partisan gerrymandering, a 
party can receive forty percent of the statewide votes yet only win thirty percent of the seats). 
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hundred ten citizens who always vote for the Democratic candidate 
and one hundred sixty-five citizens who always vote for the 
Republican candidate.32 One would initially assume that, because 
there are more Democratic voters, the Democratic Party would 
control a majority of the districts. However, legislators can draw 
district lines in such a way that District A has one hundred 
Democratic voters and twenty-five Republican voters, District B has 
fifty Democratic voters and seventy-five Republican voters, and 
District C has sixty Democratic voters and sixty-five Republican 
voters.33 Under this scheme, even though Democrats make up a 
majority of the population, Republicans control a majority of the 
legislature.34 Since district manipulation like this can be so effective, 
partisan gerrymandering is a ubiquitous and often abused tool of state 
legislatures.35 
Table 1. Hypothetical Districting Scheme 
District Democratic 
Voters 
Republican 
Voters 
Winning 
Party 
A 100 25 Democratic 
B 50 75 Republican 
C 60 65 Republican 
Total 210 165  
  
The method of voter distribution used above is commonly referred 
to as “packing and cracking.”36 The legislative majority will try to 
burden the opposing party by “packing” a large number of the 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Infra TABLE 1. This hypothetical is based on one that Weiss gave when describing how 
gerrymandering works in winner-take-all elections. Weiss, supra note 10, at 696. However, unlike 
Weiss’s, this example adheres to the legal requirement that each district have the same number of voters. 
Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 840. In recent years, peaking during the 2012 
election cycle, reapportionment plans have shown a large disparity in party favoritism and vote-to-seat 
efficiency, namely in favor of Republicans. Id. at 831. “In fact, the plans in effect today are the most 
extreme gerrymanders in modern history.” Id. 
 36. E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298 (2004); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 
851. 
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opposing party’s voters into a few districts which that party will 
easily win.37 The rest of the opposing party’s voters are “cracked” 
and divided among many districts for them to narrowly lose.38 
Although packing and cracking votes is a common indicator of 
partisan gerrymandering cases,39 not every packed and cracked 
redistricting plan is improper.40 Constitutional districting principles 
that courts traditionally uphold include contiguity, compactness, and 
conformity with geographic features.41 Though not a guarantee, a 
plan that satisfies these factors will make it more likely to adhere to 
the “one person, one vote” principle that safeguards individuals’ 
constitutional right to vote.42 However, the area between acceptable 
and excessive gerrymandering, even when traditional notions are 
employed, is gray and gives rise to litigation seeking a bright line.43 
B.   The Modern History of Gerrymandering 
Courts have consistently struggled and contradicted themselves not 
only in finding a means of determining if a district map 
unconstitutionally infringes on a group’s voting rights but also in 
determining if the issue is justiciable.44 Despite these troubles, a 
                                                                                                                 
 37. E.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 
(2018); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851. 
 38. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 343; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851. 
 39. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 116–17 (1986) (referring to the phenomenon as 
“stacking” and “splitting”). In their claims, the plaintiffs in Vieth, League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 
and Whitford all addressed the “packing” and “cracking” of a group of voters. League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 409 (2006); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272; Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 
854. 
 40. Weiss, supra note 10, at 697. 
 41. E.g., Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 888; Weiss, supra note 10, at 697 (listing “geographical 
contiguity, geographic compactness, preserving communities of interest, and nesting” among the other 
districting principles). 
 42. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 888 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)) 
(“[Traditional districting principles] are constitutionally permissible, but not ‘constitutionally 
required.’”). Contra Davis, 478 U.S. at 116 (finding the defendants’ explanations for why their plan did 
not conform to traditional criteria—such as the adherence to the one person, one vote principle—
inadequate). 
 43. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 887. The Court also said that regardless of this ambiguity, “an 
intent to entrench a political party in power signals an excessive injection of politics into the 
redistricting process that impinges on the representational rights of those associated with the party out of 
power,” which will satisfy the intent prong of an equal protection violation. Id. Therefore, the “intent to 
entrench a political party” may give some clarity to gerrymandering cases. Id. 
 44. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306. The plurality found that claims of partisan gerrymandering are a 
7
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justiciable standard eventually emerged; one that looks to the district 
plan’s discriminatory intent, effect, and any justifications in defense 
of that effect.45 Nevertheless, this intent-and-effect standard took 
many years to develop and is an amalgam of its failed predecessors.46 
Baker v. Carr marked one of the first major decisions in modern 
apportionment litigation.47 The Supreme Court defied tradition and 
held malapportionment violations of the Equal Protection Clause 
justiciable—that is, federal courts may hear and decide such cases.48 
Nearly twenty-five years later, another challenge to a districting 
plan made its way to the Supreme Court.49 In Davis v. Bandemer, the 
Supreme Court, with a six-Justice majority, held that partisan 
gerrymandering claims specifically presented a justiciable 
controversy.50 However, the Court split when determining the correct 
standard to apply.51 The plurality said there is a violation when the 
                                                                                                                 
nonjusticiable political questions, stating that the finding of justiciability in Davis was mistaken. Id. 
 45. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884 (prohibiting “a redistricting scheme which (1) is intended to 
place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual citizens on the basis of their 
political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative 
grounds”). 
 46. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 469 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (“[A] finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence 
of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters 
of a fair chance to influence the political process.”). 
 47. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 203–04 (1962) (holding an apportionment case may be reviewed on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds as long as the grounds are independent from those of political 
questions); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 143 (5th 
ed. 2015); Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 254. 
 48. Baker, 369 U.S. at 228–30; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, at 47; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution . . . .”). The Supreme Court had long held that challenges to the constitutionality of 
malapportioned state legislatures—often brought under the Guaranty Clause—were a political question 
not suitable for judicial review. Baker, 369 U.S. at 228. However, when those claims are brought under 
the Equal Protection Clause, they do not pose political questions unanswerable by the Court because, 
unlike the lack of judicially manageable standards under the Guaranty Clause, “[j]udicial standards 
under the Equal Protection Clause are well-developed and familiar.” Id. at 226, 228. 
 49. Davis, 478 U.S. at 113. Democratic voters contested Indiana’s 1981 reapportionment plan, 
passed by a Republican-controlled state legislature. Id. A district court found the reapportionment plan 
gave unfair advantage to Republicans and, as such, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. 
 50. Id. at 127; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 840. Although the Court concluded that 
the issue is justiciable, it reversed the district court’s finding that the plan was unconstitutional. Davis, 
478 U.S. at 129–30. Though Democrats did not receive representation proportional to the statewide 
vote, the Court held that this “political fairness” principle does not mean that the Constitution requires it. 
Id. at 131. Additionally, a violation does not occur when a plan merely makes winning elections more 
difficult. Id. at 131–32. 
 51. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 840. 
8
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plaintiffs prove “both intentional discrimination against an 
identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that 
group.”52 Justice Powell, conversely, argued for a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach that would consider traditional districting 
principles.53 
After another long gap, the Supreme Court again confronted the 
gerrymandering issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer.54 The standard the Court 
attempted to construct in Davis proved so difficult to apply that using 
it would have “produced the same result . . . as would have [been] 
obtained if the question were nonjusticiable.”55 The lack of a 
judicially discernible and manageable standard led the plurality in 
Vieth to backtrack and declare all gerrymandering claims 
nonjusticiable political questions,56 despite the many standards 
presented to and created by the Court.57 Further, Justice Kennedy left 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (“[S]uch a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence 
of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters 
of a fair chance to influence the political process.”). Proving a redistricting plan’s discriminatory intent 
and effect may evidence an Equal Protection violation because such a violation occurs when the 
electoral system consistently and “substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to 
influence the political process effectively.” Id. at 133. 
 53. Id. at 138 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell pointed to key 
factors like the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, the nature of 
the procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted, and the legislative history reflecting 
contemporaneous legislative goals. Id. 
 54. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 271–72. Democrats registered to vote in Pennsylvania contended that the 
districts created by legislative and executive officers served for no other reason than “for the sake of 
partisan advantage.” Id. at 272–73. 
 55. Id. at 279; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 841. This difficulty came from Davis’s 
requirement of consistent degradation of voters’ rights, which ultimately caused claims presented “prior 
to the first election under a plan, or even after one or two elections,” to universally fail. Stephanopoulos 
& McGhee, supra note 14, at 840–41. It also stemmed from many courts’ recognition that challenges to 
a plan were not sufficient if founded solely on electoral disadvantage. Id. at 841. 
 56. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (“[N]o judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating 
political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political 
gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable and that Davis was wrongly decided.”). Contra Davis, 478 
U.S. at 127 (“[T]he political gerrymandering claim in this case is justiciable . . . .”). 
 57. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to 
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it . . . .”); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 841. Appellants in Vieth proposed a 
standard that requires the plaintiff show predominant partisan intent, systematic packing and cracking of 
a party’s voters, and a party’s inability to translate a majority of its votes into a majority of seats. Id. at 
841. Justice Souter recommended a multi-factor, burden-shifting test that considered the following: (1) 
whether the plaintiff belonged to a cohesive political group; (2) whether the plaintiff’s district of 
residence conformed to traditional districting criteria; (3) whether specific correlations between the 
9
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the door open for new standards that may deem partisan 
gerrymandering justiciable in the future.58 This disagreement in the 
Court left the law ambiguous and further compounded the challenges 
presented by gerrymandering claims.59 
Despite the troubles of Vieth, League of United Latin Am. Citizens 
v. Perry (LULAC) gave promise to the idea of justiciable 
gerrymandering cases.60 To establish their claim, the plaintiffs 
employed a partisan symmetry standard that measures “partisan bias” 
by “compar[ing] how both parties would fare hypothetically if they 
each (in turn) had received a given percentage of the vote.’”61 Even 
though the Court ultimately rejected the partisan symmetry 
standard’s applicability to this case because it was too hypothetical 
and not a reliable enough measure for determining a threshold on 
partisan dominance, a majority of the Justices expressed belief that it 
is possible to find a judicially discernable and manageable standard.62 
                                                                                                                 
district’s nonconformity for those criteria and his group’s population distribution exist; (4) whether there 
was a hypothetical map of the plaintiff’s district where the proportion of the plaintiff’s group was higher 
or lower and conformed more with traditional criteria than the actual map; and (5) whether the 
defendant intentionally manipulated the district’s shape to pack or crack the plaintiff’s group. Vieth, 541 
U.S. at 347–50 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 58. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While agreeing with the plurality that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish a claim, “[Justice Kennedy] would not foreclose all possibility of judicial 
relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the 
Constitution in some redistricting cases.” Id. 
 59. Weiss, supra note 10, at 700. Notwithstanding the plan’s discriminatory intent, the district court 
dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs failed to allege a sustainable argument for the plan’s 
discriminatory effect on Democratic voters. Id. at n.47. 
 60. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 410 (2006) (holding that part of the 
Texas redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act). Texas Democrats brought this suit in 2002 
because a Republican-controlled government enacted a mid-decennial redistricting that gave 
Republicans a supermajority. Id. at 412. The plan was very successful and caused the Texas delegation 
to go from having seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans in the 2002 election to having only 
eleven Democrats and twenty-one Republicans in the 2004 election. Id. at 412–13. Before this case 
arrived at the Supreme Court, the district court dismissed it and noted that while the only purpose of the 
Texas legislature’s enactment of the plan was to gain partisan advantage, a lack of a manageable 
standard hindered the claim’s success. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 474 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 61. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Gary King, et al., in Support of Neither Party at *5, League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (No. 05-204), 2006 WL 53994. Plaintiffs also 
proposed a “sole-intent” standard, arguing that mid-decade redistricting for openly partisan reasons 
provided a reliable standard for the Court to use. Id. 
 62. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420 (stating that the Court is “wary of adopting 
a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical 
state of affairs”); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 842–44. Several justices, particularly 
Justice Stevens, advocated for a more developed and precise form of partisan symmetry. League of 
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C.   The Current State of Affairs 
1.   The Efficiency Gap 
Recognizing the possibilities for developing a legal test that the 
Supreme Court would accept, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, a professor 
at the University of Chicago Law School, and Eric M. McGhee, a 
political scientist, ventured to do just that in 2015 when they 
developed the EG.63 The goal of partisan gerrymandering—winning 
as many legislative seats as possible with a certain amount of votes—
is best achieved when a party’s votes are translated into seats more 
efficiently than the opponent’s, usually through packing and 
cracking.64 The EG focuses on this efficiency, or lack thereof, by 
analyzing the number of wasted votes a single-member district 
inevitably produces in every election.65 Wasted votes are any votes 
that do not contribute to a victory.66 Wasted votes include any vote 
for a losing candidate and votes cast for a winning candidate in 
surplus of the number needed to win—fifty percent of the votes plus 
one.67 The differences between each parties’ respective wasted votes 
are then divided by the total number of votes cast in the election to 
generate a percentage.68 Therefore, the more wasted votes a party 
has, the less effectively it has translated its votes into representation, 
and the more systematically disadvantaged it is compared to the other 
party.69 The EG merely represents this inefficiency in a single 
number.70 
                                                                                                                 
United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens proposed that (1) a 
sufficiently large deviation from symmetry is a prima facie case of unconstitutionality, and (2) the 
burden then shifts to defendant to prove there are legislatively justified reasons for this asymmetry. Id. 
 63. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 831. 
 64. Id. at 850–51. 
 65. Id. at 850. 
 66. Id. at 851. 
 67. Id. Votes cast for a losing candidate stem from their voters being “cracked”; excess votes cast for 
a winning candidate result from “packed” voters. Id. at 850. 
 68. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 850. 
 69. Id. at 850. 
 70. Id. 
11
Freeman: Partisan Gerrymandering and Georgia: Red, White, and Blue or Just
Published by Reading Room,
498 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
The EG aggregates a district’s wasted votes “into a single, tidy 
number.”71 It calculates the net number of wasted votes and divides it 
by the total number of votes cast.72 Stephanopoulos and McGhee 
suggest applying an EG threshold of eight percent to a districting 
plan, above which is indicative of “severe gerrymandering.”73 
However, this threshold is merely a suggestion that the Supreme 
Court has discretion to change or even eliminate altogether.74 The 
Court has the option to simply “strike down plans with extremely 
high efficiency gaps and to uphold plans with very low gaps” and 
develop a threshold from there.75 Stephanopoulos and McGhee also 
stress that it is simply a measure of a specific mechanism behind 
partisan gerrymandering and not a complete legal test in and of 
itself.76 Thus, determining a plan’s discriminatory effect on a certain 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 834. 
 72. Id. at 851–53. Total Democratic/Republican Wasted Votes – Total Republican/Democratic 
Wasted Votes = Total Wasted Votes. Id. Efficiency Gap = (Total Democratic/Republican Wasted Votes 
– Total Republican/Democratic Wasted Votes)  Total Votes. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 
14, at 851–53. The EG can also be calculated using either party’s seat and vote margin, if known. Id. 
Vote margins are the percentages of the statewide vote received, and seat margins are the seats won by 
one party. Id. That calculation looks like this: Efficiency Gap = (Seat Margin – 50%) – 2 (Vote Margin 
– 50%). Id. This assumes that all districts are equal in population, as constitutionally required, and that 
there are only two parties competing in a given election, which is common in single-member-district 
elections. Id. 
 73. Id. at 888–89. Stephanopoulos and McGhee calculated the EGs of state house plans over the past 
fifty years and placed plans with EGs of more than eight percent in the worst twelve percent of all plans. 
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 888. They found that several states’ plans repeatedly 
produced extremely high efficiency gaps. Id. For instance, “Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, New York, South 
Carolina, and Texas did so in the 1970s; Alabama (both plans), Georgia, Idaho (both plans), and 
Mississippi in the 1980s; Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, Ohio (second plan), and Wyoming in the 1990s; and 
Florida, Ohio, and Vermont in the 2000s.” Id. at 889. 
 74. Id. at 890–91. The Supreme Court can set the threshold as high or low, or as strictly or loosely, 
as it wants depending on the circumstances presented. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts have discretion to simply “strike down plans with extremely high efficiency gaps and to uphold 
plans with very low gaps” and develop a threshold from there if the Court’s lack of experience using the 
measure causes some apprehension. Id. at 890. This is similar to what the Court did with several 
reapportionment cases from 1967 to 1975 when it invalidated plans with higher population deviations of 
twenty percent or more while sustaining those with lower deviations of ten percent or less. 
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 890–91. 
 75. Id. at 890. 
 76. Id. at 892 (“On the merits as well, [Stephanopoulos & McGhee] believe that a rule of automatic 
invalidity for plans with excessive gaps would assign too high a premium to partisan fairness.”); see 
also McGhee, supra note 17. 
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political group’s voting rights should also give equal credence to 
other traditionally important values.77 
2.   Whitford v. Gill 
In 2011, the Wisconsin legislature swiftly drafted and enacted a 
new redistricting plan, Act 43. The governor signed the Act a little 
more than a month after it was first introduced.78 The subsequent 
state election results show the Act at work. In the 2012 election, 
Republicans received nearly three percent less of the statewide vote, 
yet secured twenty-four more seats than Democrats.79 The 2014 
election continued to show Republican dominance when Republicans 
enjoyed a twenty-seven seat advantage while only getting four 
percent more votes than their opponents.80 Consequently, Whitford, 
on behalf of twelve members of Wisconsin’s Democratic Party, filed 
suit against Gill, a member of the Wisconsin Elections Committee, 
claiming that Act 43 constitutes unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering.81 The plaintiffs established that the plan unfairly 
reduced Democratic voters’ statewide electoral influence, that Act 43 
was purposefully designed to solidify Republican control in the 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 892 (listing principles like compactness, respect 
for political subdivisions, respect for communities of interest, competitiveness, and minority 
representation). 
 78. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 846–48, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 
(2018). Wisconsin’s legislative election in 2010 marked the first time in forty years where there was a 
Republican majority in the assembly, a Republican majority in the senate, and a Republican Governor. 
Id. at 846. In January 2011, Scott Fitzgerald, Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader, and Jeff Fitzgerald, 
Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, created a coalition of staff members, professors, and attorneys to 
start working on a reapportionment plan for the state’s legislative districts. Id. at 846–48. After several 
months of development, the plan was introduced by the Committee on Senate Organization on July 11, 
2011. Id. at 853. The senate and assembly passed the Act on July 19, 2011, and July 20, 2011, 
respectively. Id. The Governor signed the Act on August 23, 2011. Id. 
 79. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 899–901. Specifically, the Republicans garnered 48.6% of the vote, 
but secured sixty seats in the assembly. Id. at 899. Comparatively, the Democrats received 51.4% of 
votes, but only secured thirty-nine seats. Id. at 901. 
 80. Id. More precisely, Republicans acquired 52% of the vote and got sixty-three seats. Id. at 899. 
That same election saw Democrats’ vote share decrease to 48% and their seat share drop to thirty-six. 
Id. at 901. 
 81. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 843. The Campaign Legal Center, with Whitford as the lead 
plaintiff, filed this suit against Gill, the chairman of the state elections board, claiming that Act 43 
violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the Act systematically dilutes Democratic 
voter strength in comparison to their Republican counterparts. Id. at 855. 
13
Freeman: Partisan Gerrymandering and Georgia: Red, White, and Blue or Just
Published by Reading Room,
500 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
legislature, and that adopting a different map would remove the 
impediment on Democratic voters and redress the constitutional 
violation.82 Having satisfied the standing requirements, the district 
court agreed to hear the plaintiffs’ case.83 
The district court stated that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
“prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) is intended to place a 
severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual 
citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, 
and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds.”84 
By looking to the Republicans’ mapmaking process and the new 
district lines, the plaintiffs met the discriminatory intent requirement 
and showed that the Republicans injected an excessive amount of 
politics into the redistricting process to impinge on the Democrats’ 
representational rights.85 In proving Act 43’s discriminatory effect, 
the plaintiffs employed the EG as a key factor in their analysis.86 
Using a calculation “simplified method,”87 the trial expert found a 
pro-Republican EG of thirteen percent in 2012 and a pro-Republican 
EG of ten percent in 2014.88 The burden then shifted to the defendant 
to prove that other legislative considerations justified the Act’s 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 56. 
 84. Id. at 884. 
 85. Id. at 887 n.170 (dictum) (“The intent we require, therefore, is not simply an ‘intent to act for 
political purposes,’ but an intent to make the political system systematically unresponsive to a particular 
segment of the voters based on their political preference (citation omitted).”). The plaintiffs produced 
evidence that legislative drafters devised multiple alternative maps to determine the electoral effects of 
different district lines. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 891. Each of these maps was more favorable to 
Republicans than the last and resulted in a higher number of “safe” and “leaning” Republican districts. 
Id. at 891–92. The map ultimately enacted was the one that most significantly increased the number of 
Republican-leaning districts, even though several alternative maps would have still yielded a Republican 
majority while resulting in a less severe partisan outcome. Id. at 897. 
 86. Id. at 854. The plaintiffs also relied on the vote and seat share statistics derived from the 2012 
and 2014 elections. Id. at 905–06. These actual election results overcame the flaws the Supreme Court 
worried about when assessing the plaintiffs’ hypothetical election results under a less partisan regime in 
cases like Davis and League of United Latin Am. Citizens. Id. at 903. 
 87. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851–53. Efficiency Gap = (Total 
Democratic/Republican Wasted Votes – Total Republican/Democratic Wasted Votes)  Total Votes. Id. 
 88. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 904–05. Based on historical data of single-district, simple-plurality 
systems like Wisconsin, trial experts found that for every one percent increase in a party’s vote share, its 
seat share will increase by two percent. Id. at 904. This ratio was then used in calculating the EGs. Id. at 
905. 
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effect.89 The district court ultimately rejected the defendant’s 
arguments that Wisconsin’s political geography accounted for Act 
43’s discriminatory effect because the impact of the state’s pro-
Republican geography is too minuscule to overcome the weight of 
the plaintiffs’ evidence.90 Accordingly, the court rendered judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs.91 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found the plaintiffs lacked standing 
because their suit concerned generalized “group political interests, 
not individual legal rights” to vote.92 The Court then remanded the 
case to allow the plaintiffs to prove the individualized burden on their 
votes.93 Justice Kagan’s concurrence explicitly details what the 
majority only alludes to: The ability of plaintiffs to have standing 
against a statewide gerrymander, and the EG’s ability to adequately 
measure partisan asymmetry and provide evidence of 
unconstitutionality that warrants statewide judicial relief.94 
D.   Georgia’s Perspective 
The Georgia General Assembly makes up Georgia’s legislative 
branch with the house’s 180 members being elected from single-
member-districts.95 Despite enacting a district plan in 2012,96 the 
legislature redrew the map in 2015 under Georgia House Bill 566.97 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 910. 
 90. Id. at 912, 923–24. In addition to arguing that Wisconsin’s political geography naturally packs 
and cracks Democratic voters in and around urban centers, the defendant emphasized the Act’s 
accordance with traditional districting criteria. Id. at 911, 919. Recognizing that “compliance with 
traditional districting principles [does not] necessarily create[] a constitutional ‘safe harbor’ for state 
legislatures,” the district court also rejected this argument of the defendant. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 
912. 
 91. Id. at 843. 
 92. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018). 
 93. Id. at 1934. 
 94. Id. at 1937 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 95. GA. CONST. art. III, § II, para. 1; Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 
3d 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ga. 2017). Georgia’s legislative elections require a candidate receive a majority of 
the vote. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1270. If that majority is not attained, then a runoff will be held 
between the two candidates with the most votes. Id. at 1270–71. 
 96. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271. Following the norm of implementing redistricting plans after 
every census, Georgia’s 2012 plan was based on the most recent census data. Id. 
 97. Id.; H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). In addition to excluding African-
American legislators, minority residents were also denied the ability to publicly comment on it, the 
district court “accept[ed] the complaint’s allegation that Georgia House Bill 566 redrew district lines to 
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African-American legislators were excluded from the drafting 
process and were not allowed input on the issue.98 In response, a suit 
was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Georgia.99 The suit focused on state districts 105 and 111 as newly 
redrawn under Georgia House Bill 566 and claimed that the plan 
unconstitutionally partisan gerrymanders those districts.100 Having 
determined justiciability, the district court relied on the same three-
pronged “intent, effect, and justification” standard used in 
Whitford.101 Although the plaintiffs showed discriminatory intent, 
they failed to show a discriminatory effect by not proffering a 
judicially manageable standard.102 However, if such effect can be 
proven, Georgia House Bill 566 may indeed be an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander. 
II.   Analysis 
One aspect of gerrymandering the Supreme Court does agree on is 
that “an excessive injection of politics” into the redistricting process 
                                                                                                                 
make certain districts safer for white Republican incumbents.” NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271. 
 98. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271. 
 99. See generally id. at 1266. 
 100. Id. at 1270, 1273 (alleging that Georgia House Bill 566 also constitutes racial gerrymandering in 
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). Plaintiffs contend that, because of Georgia 
House Bill 566, they “did not have an equal opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice in 2016, and 
that they will continue to be so deprived in the 2018 or 2020 elections.” Id. at 1273. Plaintiffs also 
alleged that Georgia House Bill 566 intentionally removed Democratic voters from Districts 105 and 
111 to make them uncompetitive and ensure a Republican victory. Id. 
 101. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 
(2018); NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1281–82. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
district court looked to Davis, Vieth, and LULAC and concluded that because the Supreme Court has 
upheld the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering cases in the past, this case is also justiciable under 
current case law. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1281–82. Looking to the standard in Whitford based 
around the concept of entrenchment, the district court said a redistricting scheme is unconstitutional 
when it “(1) is intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual 
citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, 
legitimate grounds.” Id. 
 102. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1278–79, 1284. Under the 2012 plan, District 105’s voting 
population for Caucasians and African-Americans was 48.4% and 32.4% respectively. Id. at 1271. 
Under the Georgia House Bill 566 plan, that same population changed to 52.7% Caucasian and 30.4% 
African-American. Id. Similarly, in 2012, District 111 was 56.1% Caucasian and 33.2% African-
American, and was 58.1% Caucasian and 31% African-American in 2014. Id. at 1272. However, instead 
of engaging any sort of standard or metric, the plaintiffs only made conclusory allegations that 
defendants minimized the voting strength of Democrats. Id. at 1285. 
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violates the Constitution.103 From this uniform recognition, specific 
elements of constitutionality have repeatedly emerged.104 At the core 
of these elements is the need to show: (1) the plan’s intent to 
discriminate against an identifiable group’s voting power; (2) the 
plan actually has that result; and (3) that no legitimate legislative 
purpose can justify that effect.105 Thus, a plan may still be 
constitutional if it satisfies the Court’s other factors even though its 
EG is above the threshold.106 This standard’s success heavily depends 
on the effects prong—how to identify when an injection of politics is 
excessive.107 That is precisely what the EG was created to do.108 
A.   The Efficiency Gap’s Strengths and Weaknesses 
1.   Addressing the Court’s Concerns 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee hold the EG out not as a broad legal 
test, but as a precise measure of efficiency “across a wide range of 
outcomes” that corresponds to a plan’s partisan fairness.109 Any 
district plan’s EG can be calculated regardless of the level of 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287–88, 293 (2004) (emphasis omitted); see also Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (“[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral 
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on 
the political process as a whole.”). 
 104. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 127 (agreeing with the lower courts that “in order to succeed the 
Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable 
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group”); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 871 
(“[A] successful political gerrymandering claim must include a showing of both discriminatory intent 
and discriminatory effect.”). 
 105. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884, 928; NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1282; Brief of Bernard 
Grofman & Ronald Keith Gaddie, supra note 10, at *8 (“The Court should adopt a test for 
unconstitutional gerrymandering that requires a showing of three specific elements: partisan asymmetry, 
lack of responsiveness, and causation.”). 
 106. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 892 (“On the merits as well, we believe that a rule 
of automatic invalidity for plans with excessive gaps would assign too high a premium to partisan 
fairness.”). 
 107. Justin Levitt, Symposium: Intent Is Enough, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-intent-enough/ [https://perma.cc/P54T-2KDX]; see 
also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (“[N]o judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating 
political gerrymandering claims have emerged.”). 
 108. See McGhee, supra note 17. 
 109. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 854; McGhee, supra note 17 (“We folded the EG 
into a possible legal test: a set of rules that clearly articulates how to weigh competing interests and 
principles in a wide range of situations so justice is as swift and certain as possible.”). 
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electoral dominance one party enjoys.110 The EG is applicable to 
districts so dominated by a single party that redistricting previously 
seemed futile and, as such, can rebut arguments that gerrymandering 
claims are only important in electoral systems where a plan could 
affect legislative control.111 This feature is particularly advantageous 
given the Republican Party’s pronounced control in Georgia.112 The 
EG also addresses concerns that the Court expressed in Davis, 
LULAC, and Vieth.113 For example, Justice Kennedy feared adopting 
the standard in LULAC because it speculatively calculated a plan’s 
partisan bias before elections were even held under the plan.114 The 
EG avoids this issue by relying on actual election results as opposed 
to hypothetical ones.115 
On the other hand, the EG’s reliance on concrete election results 
may give new plans a beneficial grace period where they are enforced 
and unchallenged until one or more elections are held and enough 
data is finally generated.116 Still, the potential for litigation of these 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 855. Districts and states where one party has such 
a great political advantage “have been shielded from [judicial] scrutiny” because it is thought that no 
redistricting plan, no matter how much it modifies districts, would change the legislature. Id. An 
example of such is Wyoming, where the Republican Party was the majority of both the state’s house and 
senate every year from 1992 to 2013. Wyoming State Legislature, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Wyoming_State_Legislature [https://perma.cc/8NLH-24YA] (last visited Dec. 
20, 2017). 
 111. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 855. The position that the EG is inapplicable to 
heavily gerrymandered districts is too restrictive, especially for states like California that require a 
supermajority to pass legislature. Id. 
 112. See GA. SEC’Y OF STATE, General Election: November 8, 2016, 
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/63991/184321/en/summary.html [https://perma.cc/MXZ3-
RDR2] (last updated Dec. 1, 2016 2:06 PM) [hereinafter General Election 2016] (showing that, in 2016, 
only sixty-two of Georgia’s one hundred eighty house districts voted for a Democratic representative 
and only four congressional representatives from Georgia are Democrats). 
 113. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 848–49. 
 114. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality 
opinion) (“[W]e are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair 
results that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.”); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, 
at 856. To reiterate, partisan bias is the divergence in how many seats each party would win if each was 
allotted the same percent of statewide votes. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420. For 
instance, if, under Georgia House Bill 566, Republicans would win 55% of Georgia’s seats with only 
50% of Georgia’s votes, then the Bill would have a pro-Republican bias of 5%. See Stephanopoulos & 
McGhee, supra note 14, at 856. 
 115. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 896 (“We have used only past election 
outcomes—not predicted future ones—to calculate the efficiency gap.”). 
 116. See id. at 897 (“Even if the threat of litigation was an election cycle away, it still would be 
proximate enough to produce compliance in most cases.”). 
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plans may discourage legislators from enacting them in the first 
place.117 Justice Kennedy was also hesitant about solely basing 
unconstitutionality on asymmetrical partisanship.118 The EG, as a 
metric of asymmetry, calculates only that.119 A broader legal test 
should also implement other measures to account for what the EG 
does not.120 This is where traditional districting principles would 
weigh for or against an initial finding of a large EG.121 
2.   Instability 
Although addressing many past concerns, the EG still faces several 
limitations. For one, it suffers from long-term instability.122 Though it 
is theoretically possible for a district’s EG to remain constant 
throughout a plan’s life, the EG is more likely to fluctuate in 
actuality.123 A district’s EG may vary due to shifts in voting 
proportions based on mass voter relocation, changes in voters’ 
political ideologies, or voters supporting other parties for reasons 
unrelated to party affiliation, like a candidate’s personal qualities.124 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. Although the plans are abandoned immediately after the first election, the partisan advantage 
under the plan would also be abandoned, “communities might be destabilized, competitiveness might 
surge, and incumbents might be imperiled.” Id. 
 118. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e 
are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair 
results . . . . [A]symmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”). 
 119. McGhee, supra note 17 (“It does not directly measure (among other things) majority party 
entrenchment, competitiveness, racial or ethnic minority representation, district shapes, the durability of 
any partisan advantage, or whether the redistricting authority intended to benefit either party when it 
drew the maps. But a good measure does not try to bite off more than it can chew.”). 
 120. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 898 (advocating for a two-stage analysis where 
first the plan’s asymmetry is measured using the EG, and is balanced against other factors in the second 
stage to see if it was necessary for the gap to exceed the relevant threshold). 
 121. Id. (pointing to criteria such as respect for political subdivisions, the underlying political 
geography, compactness, and other oft-cited principles). 
 122. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. & Allied Educ. Found. in Support of Appellants at 6–
8, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial 
Watch]; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 864. 
 123. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at 6–8; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra 
note 14, at 864 (stating that when the EG was first used it “showed that most redistricting plans are 
volatile enough that their precise consequences cannot be forecast with great accuracy”). “The 
mathematical tool for predicting the fair translation of votes to seats in single-member districts is the ‘S’ 
curve,” but the value of the formula on which the “S” curve is based is empirically determined from 
estimations of real-world elections, which significantly vary. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, 
supra note 122, at 3–4. 
 124. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at 13 (“Deviations from proportional 
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Such volatility makes it difficult to predict the impact of future 
elections, and, consequently, a district’s EG in the long run.125 
Moreover, the EG’s dependence on the efficiency by which votes 
are translated into seats may represent “hyperproportionalism.” This 
is neither a constitutional right nor a useful means of calculating 
gerrymandering because not every divergence from proportionality is 
the product of unconstitutional political maneuvering.126 Some maps 
with large, durable EGs may consistently advantage one party.127 
Still, others with smaller EGs continue to suffer from instability.128 
Using sensitivity testing to determine the probability that a 
particular result will remain true may resolve some stability 
problems.129 Sensitivity testing would involve uniformly shifting the 
vote shares of each party in one election to yield a spectrum of 
possible results that show how the EG could change in future 
elections and the probability that an EG will persist.130 While 
sensitivity testing may reduce some volatility concerns, it will not 
eliminate them, and it does not foreclose the possibility that 
significant changes in voting may severely alter the plan’s EG for the 
worse.131 
                                                                                                                 
representation, however defined, may occur for any number of reasons other than gerrymandering.”). 
 125. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 864; Levitt, supra note 107 (noting that the 
performance of a plan in previous elections does not necessitate a similar result in future elections). 
 126. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at 14–15; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (“[A] group’s electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the 
simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more difficult, and a failure of 
proportional representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”). Although the EG would not require strict, one-to-one proportional representation, 
it “would limit deviations from whatever level of representation was required by the ‘S’ curve,” which is 
essentially just another form of proportional representation. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra 
note 122, at 13. 
 127. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 864–65. State house plans like Idaho’s have 
proven very stable because that state’s EG has always been enormously pro-Republican. Id. at 882–84. 
Since 1970, Idaho’s EG remained above ten percent, stretching to seventeen percent at its height. Id. 
 128. Id. at 864–65. 
 129. See Statistical Test, WOLFRAM, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/StatisticalTest.html 
[https://perma.cc/T849-F7Z6] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
 130. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 874. Stephanopoulos and McGhee chose the scale 
and direction of voting shifts based on levels of shifts that historically occurred in most prior elections. 
Id. The result was shifts of 7.5% in either direction for Congress and 5.5% in either direction for state 
houses. Id. 
 131. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at 13–15. 
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3.   Uncontested Districts 
The EG’s biggest limitation is its sensitivity to uncontested 
districts, which decreases its accuracy.132 This shortcoming is 
particularly relevant here because so many Georgia districts go 
uncontested.133 Again, the number of votes each party wastes is 
central to the EG.134 So, when a party needs only one vote to win, 
wasted votes become harder to capture.135 Determining how many 
voters a plan packs and cracks through wasted votes inherently 
requires distinguishing between voters’ preferences and identifying 
the party for which voters vote.136 
For example, in a district where there is only chicken and pork, 
Smith prefers to eat chicken. A new disease, however, recently 
eradicated all chickens in the district. Though Smith still prefers 
chicken, he can now only eat pork because that is the only food 
available; he has no choice. Like Smith, voters in uncontested 
districts have no other option but to vote for the one and only 
candidate running.137 A lack of choice offers voters no opportunity to 
show their political preferences, making it nearly impossible to 
identify how much a plan packs and cracks.138 Smith and everyone 
else who favor chicken over pork would surely eat chicken if 
possible, which would change the total amount of pork and chicken 
eaten. The results of an uncontested race would similarly change if it 
were contested.139 While the same candidate may still win and pork 
may still be more popular, the number of votes for the winner and the 
amount of pork eaten would in all likelihood be lower.140 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 865–66. 
 133. See General Election 2016, supra note 112. One hundred forty-nine of Georgia’s 180 districts 
went uncontested in the 2016 state house election. Id. 
 134. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 849–50. 
 135. See id. at 865. 
 136. Id. (affirming that not knowing how many people in each district vote for each party presents a 
“tricky problem for any measure of gerrymandering”). 
 137. Id. (“[T]he notion of support hinges on freedom of choice: voters must be able, in principle, to 
select more than one option.”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 865. 
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An accurate and complete EG analysis cannot disregard 
uncontested races or treat those races as if there was unanimous 
support for the unopposed party.141 One can examine past contested 
elections in the district and apply the results to the current 
uncontested election to try to avoid this dilemma.142 Alternatively, a 
specific vote share can be assigned to the unrepresented party.143 But 
this obviously imposes imprecise and hypothetical measurements on 
a standard that already suffers from similar criticism. A more 
accurate technique is to gather voting data from federal elections, like 
presidential races, and use those outcomes to create a mean vote 
share for the party.144 Regardless of the method used, the result is still 
one based on assumption, and though the EG is largely a firm and 
practicable standard, this adds to its faults. 
B.   Analysis of Georgia House Bill 566 
Enacted in 2015, House Bill 566 is Georgia’s most recent 
redistricting plan that shifted many voting lines.145 Using the same 
standards as Whitford v. Gill, House Bill 566 is unconstitutional if 
three elements are shown: (1) the plan was intentionally enacted to 
discriminate against a political group and impede its voting 
effectiveness; (2) the plan has that effect; and (3) the plan’s effect is 
not justified on other legitimate legislative grounds.146 
1.   Intent 
Contrary to using the EG to show discriminatory effect, a showing 
of intent is less direct and clear-cut.147 When one party creates a new 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Id. at 867. 
 142. Id. at 866. 
 143. Id. at 866–67. 
 144. Id. at 867. 
 145. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (revising the borders of seventeen 
districts). 
 146. E.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 
(2018). 
 147. See id. at 884–85. Determining when discriminatory intent is excessive is an “open question” 
because “some level of partisanship is permissible, or at least inevitable, in redistricting legislation.” Id. 
at 885. 
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map, it is almost always intended to favor the majority party and 
disfavor the other.148 Currently, it is in the controlling party’s interest 
to draft schemes that will continue to favor it.149 Thus, the intent 
required for this first prong usually is easily met.150 
Looking at the mapmaking process will shed light on its intent.151 
Though districting plans are ordinarily adopted after the census, a 
Republican legislature passed House Bill 566 in the middle of the 
decennial cycle.152 It was also quickly enacted, passing both the 
house and the senate less than a month after being first introduced.153 
The exclusion of African-American legislators from the districting 
process further evidences the Bill’s discriminatory intent.154 
Although political affiliation is not necessarily determinable by race, 
party and race have a strong correlation in Georgia.155 Of the 119 
Republican members of the state house, none are African-American, 
and only one is not Caucasian.156 On the other hand, seventy-five 
percent of House Democrats are African-American.157 Thus, it is not 
a stretch to infer that all African-Americans barred from the drafting 
process were Democrats. Although some minority residents were not 
allowed public comment on the Bill,158 this race-based exclusion is 
not as easily equated to a party-based one due to the lack of data 
about those residents and the lack of data suggesting strong 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See Brief for Appellants at 63, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161). 
 149. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 474 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens conceded “that legislatures will always be aware of 
politics and that [the Court] must tolerate some consideration of political goals in the redistricting 
process.” Id. 
 150. See id.; Weiss, supra note 10, at 722. 
 151. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 891–92. Drafters devised multiple alternative maps to 
determine the electoral effects of different district lines with each being more favorable to Republicans 
than the last. Id. 
 152. Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1271 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
 153. See H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
 154. Compare NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271 (finding that “African-American legislators were 
excluded from the process of drawing and negotiating”), with Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 894 (finding 
discriminatory intent where drafters of Act 43 solely sought help from Republican members of the 
assembly and only presented the final plan at the Republican caucus). 
 155. See NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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correlations between a person’s minority status and political 
affiliation. 
More information on the drafting process would also be useful but 
not likely determinative regarding intent. For instance, the basis on 
which House Bill 566’s district lines were drawn, the number of 
alternative maps created, and the extent to which those alternatives 
affected districts’ partisanship would all be valuable. Although a 
plaintiff may allege discriminatory intent against Democratic voters, 
a court would have difficulty definitively finding that intent was 
based solely on this additional information.159 
2.   Effect 
However, if a court does find sufficient evidence of discriminatory 
intent, the analysis then turns to the plan’s discriminatory effect. 
Georgia House Bill 566 redrew seventeen house districts across 
various parts of Georgia.160 A majority of those districts have 
remained uncontested in-state representative elections since 2012.161 
Following the 2015 plan, however, some previously uncontested 
districts were suddenly contested in the 2016 election cycle,162 and 
other districts experienced sharp increases or decreases in their 
voting population.163 These observations are illustrated in Table 2 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See id. at 1283–84. 
 160. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). The Bill redrew the boundaries of state 
house districts 27, 30, 53, 55, 59, 60, 73, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 130, 165, 166, 176, and 177. Id. 
 161. Compare General Election 2016, supra note 112 (districts 27, 33, 59, 104, 110, 121, 130, 165, 
166, and 176 were uncontested); with General Election: November 4, 2014, GA. SEC’Y OF STATE (last 
updated Nov. 10, 2014, 6:56 PM), 
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/54042/149045/en/summary.html [https://perma.cc/XQ7X-
B9WM] [hereinafter General Election 2014] (districts 27, 33, 59, 60, 104, 109, 121, 130, 165, 166, 176, 
and 177 were uncontested), and General Election: November 6, 2012, GA. SEC’Y OF STATE (last 
updated Nov. 21, 2012, 8:55 AM), 
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/42277/113204/en/summary.html [https://perma.cc/L2VV-
M64Y] [hereinafter General Election 2012] (districts 27, 30, 33, 59, 60, 73, 104, 109, 110, 121, 130, 
165, and 166 were uncontested). 
 162. Compare General Election 2014, supra note 161 (districts 60, 109, and 177 went uncontested); 
with General Election 2016, supra note 112 (districts 60, 109, and 177 became contested). 
 163. Compare General Election 2014, supra note 161 (showing that, approximately, district 30 had 
11,000 voters, district 60 had 8,500 voters, and district 109 had 14,000 voters, and that all of those 
districts were uncontested); with General Election 2016, supra note 112 (showing that district 30 had 
5,302 more Democratic voters—more than half of the 9,200 voters added—district 60 had 7,000 more 
Democratic voters and 1,000 more Republican voters, district 109 had 11,389 more Democratic voters 
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below, which represents the voter distribution of districts affected by 
the plan from 2012—when the decennial district plan was adopted—
to the first election under House Bill 566 in 2016.164 (The Republican 
Party is abbreviated by an “R” and the Democratic Party by a 
“D.”)165 
                                                                                                                 
but only 1,000 more Republican voters, and there were 10,000 more voters in district 111). 
 164. See infra Table 2. 
 165. See infra Table 2. 
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Table 2. Voter Distribution in Georgia House Elections 2012–
2016 
District 
R Votes 
2016 
D Votes 
2016 
R Votes 
2014 
D Votes 
2014 
R Votes 
2012 
D Votes 
2012 
27 19,469 0 12,685 0 17,290 0 
30 15,115 5,302 11,127 0 15,337 0 
33 19,190 0 12,098 0 15,584 6,161 
59 0 20,276 0 14,361 0 20,126 
60 1,443 15,824 0 8,520 0 13,374 
73 15,661 8,610 10,138 5,290 18,963 0 
104 19,776 0 13,133 0 18,267 0 
105 12,411 12,189 7,497 6,708 10,561 10,007 
109 15,507 11,389 14,096 0 19,822 0 
110 18,003 0 9,063 5,442 16,365 0 
111 14,488 13,542 9,540 8,416 13,172 11,695 
121 20,582 0 12,014 0 17,517 0 
130 16,655 0 11,060 0 13,620 0 
165 0 18,197 0 11,156 0 17,607 
166 26,255 0 17,260 0 24,041 0 
176 14,891 0 7,938 0 13,634 0 
177 5,104 9,226 0 6,582 5,338 10,998 
Total 234,550 114,555 147,649 66,475 219,511 89,968 
 
Districts 105, 109, and 111 are of particular note because of their 
competitiveness and, in the case of District 109, the large influx of 
Democratic voters under the 2015 plan.166 In 2012, the Republican 
candidate in District 105 won by 554 votes, but that same candidate 
won by only 222 votes in 2016 due to an influx of Democ  ratic 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See supra Table 2 (showing 11,389 more votes for the 2016 Democratic candidate—comprising 
47.35% of the total vote—than in the prior election). Districts 105, 109, and 111 are grey-shaded for 
easy reference because they are important for this analysis and are frequently referenced. See supra 
Table 2. 
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voters under House Bill 566.167 Similar findings are evident in 
District 109 where the uncontested Republican candidate won by 
nearly 20,000 votes in 2012 but won by little more than 4,000 in 
2016.168 Likewise, Republicans in District 111 won by 500 fewer 
votes in 2016 than in 2012.169 These voting shifts give the impression 
that because of the 2015 plan, Democratic voters were cracked into 
districts like District 109 and packed into others.170 
The first step in the EG analysis is identifying the number of votes 
each party wasted.171 Due to the many uncontested races, those 
districts’ vote shares must be apportioned.172 Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to accurately calculate their vote shares for 2012 and 
2016 because of a lack of other election data based on house 
districts.173 However, in uncontested districts that were previously 
contested, vote shares in prior contested races were proportionally 
applied to the 2014 and 2016 elections.174 To account for districts 
that have always been uncontested, a voter share of twenty-five 
percent was applied to the opposing party and seventy-five percent to 
the uncontested one.175 From there, each party’s wasted and net 
                                                                                                                 
 167. See supra Table 2. In the 2012 election, there were 554 more Republican votes than Democratic 
votes. See supra Table 2. In the 2016 election, Republican votes outnumbered Democratic votes by only 
222. See supra Table 2. 
 168. See supra Table 2. In the 2012 election, Republicans won by 19,822 votes, whereas they only 
won by 4,118 votes in 2016’s election. See supra Table 2. 
 169. See supra Table 2. In the 2012 election, the Republican candidate received 1,477 more votes 
than the Democratic candidate. See supra Table 2. But in the 2016 election, Republican votes 
outnumbered Democratic votes by only 531. See supra Table 2. 
 170. See supra Table 2. An inference that Democratic voters were packed into District 109 is easily 
made from there being no Democratic voters in the 2012 or 2014 elections, but after the 2015 plan, there 
were over 11,000 Democratic voters in 2016. See supra Table 2. Adding to this assumption is the fact 
that the district’s total number of votes cast in the 2016 election also increased. See supra Table 2. So, it 
is not just a matter of some 2014 voters voting Democrat instead of Republican. See supra Table 2. 
 171. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851–53. 
 172. Id. at 866–67. 
 173. See General Election 2016, supra note 112 (containing only information on the 2016 presidential 
election per congressional district voter shares). 
 174. See infra Table 3; see also General Election 2016, supra note 112. District 110, for example, 
went uncontested during the 2016 election. See infra Table 3. It was, however, contested in the 2014 
election with the Republican candidate garnering 62.48% of the vote and the remaining 37.52% going to 
the Democrats. See supra Table 2. Accordingly, 62.48% of the total 18,003 votes in 2016 were 
apportioned to the Republican candidate, and 37.52% were distributed to the Democratic one. See infra 
Table 3. This yielded Republicans 11,249 votes and Democrats 6,754 votes in the 2016 election 
calculation, proportional to the contested District 110 election in 2014. See infra Table 3. 
 175. Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems, 39 LEGIS. 
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wasted votes were calculated.176 Dividing the total net wasted votes 
by the total votes cast results in an EG of 6.345% in the 2012 
election, 9.559% in 2014, and, in 2016, 13.515% under House Bill 
566.177 
                                                                                                                 
STUD. Q. 55, 66 n.5 (2014) (using a “default setting for uncontested races, which assigns uncontested 
Republicans a vote share of 0.25 and uncontested Democrats a vote share of 0.75”); see also infra Table 
3. Because it has never been contested, District 27 illustrates this default allotment. See infra Table 3. 
When the 19,469 total Republican votes in District 27’s 2016 election are multiplied by seventy-five 
percent, 14,602 votes are dispensed to the Republican candidate, and the remaining 4,867, or twenty-
five percent, are given to the Democrats. See infra Table 3. This method’s inaccuracy becomes obvious 
when the net wasted votes are calculated because it always produces one net wasted vote for the losing 
party. See infra Table 3. 
 176. See infra Table 3; infra Table 4; infra Table 5. Again, wasted votes are those votes for a winning 
candidate beyond that which is needed to secure a win and all votes for a losing candidate. 
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851. For instance, the number of votes a nominee needs to 
win District 105 is 12,301—half of the 24,600 total votes in that district plus one. See infra Table 3. 
Thus, because the Republican candidate won with 12,411 votes, she wasted 110 votes. See infra Table 
3. Conversely, the losing nominee for the Democratic Party wasted all 12,189 of her votes. See infra 
Table 3. The net wasted votes in that district is then derived from the difference between each party’s 
wasted votes, which 12,079 Democratic votes in District 105. See infra Table 3. 
 177. See supra Table 3 (47,180  (234,550 + 114,555) = .13515); supra Table 4 (20,469  (147,649 + 
66,475) = .09559); supra Table 5 (19,636  (219,511 + 89,968) = .06345). 
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Table 3. Wasted Votes in the 2016 Election 
District 
Apportioned 
R Votes 
Apportioned 
D Votes 
R Wasted 
Votes 
D Wasted 
Votes 
Net Wasted 
Votes 
27 14,602 4,867 4,866 4,867 1 D 
30 15,115 5,302 4,905 5,302 397 D 
33 14,393 4,798 4,797 4,798 1 D 
59 5,069 15,207 5,069  5,068  1 R 
60 1,443 15,824 1,443 7,189 5,746 D 
73 15,661 8,610 3,524 8,610 5,086 D 
104 14,832 4,944 4,943 4,944 1 D 
105 12,411 12,189 110 12,189 12,079 D 
109 15,507 11,389 2,058 11,389 9,331 D 
110 11,248 6,755 2,245 6,755 4,510 D 
111 14,488 13,542 472 13,542 13,070 D 
121 15,437 5,146 5,145 5,146 1 D 
130 12,491 4,164 4,163 4,164 1 D 
165 4,549 13,648 4,549  4,548  1 R 
166 19,691 6,564  6,563  6,564 1 D 
176 11,168 3,723  3,722  3,723 1 D 
177 5,104 9,226 5,104 2,060 3,044 R 
    TOTAL 47,180 D 
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Table 4. Wasted Votes in the 2014 Election 
District 
Apportioned 
R Votes 
Apportioned 
D Votes 
R Wasted 
Votes 
D Wasted 
Votes 
Net Wasted 
Votes 
27  9,514   3,171  3,170  3,171  1 D 
30  8,345   2,782  2,781 2,782 1 D 
33 8,671  3,427  2,621  3,427  806 D 
59  3,590   10,771   3,590  7,180 1 R 
60  2,130   6,390   2,130  2,129 1 R 
73  10,138   5,290  2,423 5,290 2,867 D 
104  9,850   3,283  3,282  3,283  1 D 
105  7,497   6,708  393 6,708 6,315 D 
109  10,572   3,524  3,523  3,524  1 D 
110  9,063   5,442  1,809 5,442 3,633 D 
111  9,540   8,416  561 8,416 7,855 D 
121  9,011   3,004  3,003  3,004  1 D 
130  8,295   2,765  2,764  2,765  1 D 
165  2,789   8,367   2,789   2,788  1 R 
166  12,945   4,315   4,314   4,315  1 D 
176  5,954   1,985  1,984  1,985  1 D 
177  2,151  4,431  2,151  1,139  1,012 R 
    TOTAL 20,469 D 
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Table 5. Wasted Votes in the 2012 Election 
District 
Apportioned 
R Votes 
Apportioned 
D Votes 
R Wasted 
Votes 
D Wasted 
Votes 
Net Wasted 
Votes 
27  12,968   4,323 4,323  4,322  1 R 
30  11,503   3,834   3,833  3,834  1 D 
33  15,584   6,161  4,711 6,161 1,451 D 
59  5,032   15,095   5,032  5,031  1 R 
60  3,344   10,031   3,344   3,343 1 R 
73  14,222   4,741   4,740  4,741  1 D 
104  13,700   4,567   4,566  4,567  1 D 
105  10,561   10,007  276 10,007 9,731 D 
109  14,867   4,956   4,955  4,956  1 D 
110  12,274   4,091   4,090   4,091  1 D 
111  13,172   11,695  738 11,695 10,958 D 
121  13,138   4,379   4,378   4,379  1 D 
130  10,215   3,405   3,404   3,405  1 D 
165  4,402   13,205   4,402   4,401  1 R 
166  18,031   6,010   6,009   6,010  1 D 
176  10,226   3,409   3,408   3,409  1 D 
177  5,338   10,998  5,338 2,829 2,509 R 
    TOTAL 19,636 D 
 
It is ultimately up to the courts and states to set thresholds beyond 
which an EG is unacceptable.178 However, the EG in the 2016 
election is far too high to fall within any acceptable threshold.179 This 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 890–91. 
 179. See id. at 854. The EG in Georgia’s 2016 election more than doubled the eight percent threshold 
suggested by Stephanopoulos and McGhee. Id. 
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EG is well above the eight percent threshold suggested by 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee180 as well as the seven percent 
threshold argued for in Whitford v. Gill.181 An EG of this magnitude 
demonstrates the discriminatory effect House Bill 566 has on 
Democratic voters by redrawing district lines to decrease their vote’s 
impact and the efficiency with which their votes translate into 
seats.182 In 2016, for example, Democrats received 44% of the vote in 
districts affected by House Bill 566, yet they won less than 25% of 
those seats.183 
3.   Justification 
After showing discriminatory intent and effect, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to prove the effect is justified by legitimate legislative 
ends.184 Looking at traditional principles, almost all the districts that 
House Bill 566 manipulated more or less maintain a normal shape.185 
The exception is District 111, curving from Stockbridge down to the 
east and dipping in and out of different cities and neighborhoods—
coincidentally resembling a salamander.186 However, even with this 
one questionable district, the plan was enacted largely along party 
lines, it generally preserved communities of interest, and it mostly 
respected political subdivisions.187 
Another possible defense of the plan is Georgia’s natural political 
geography. The state has never been one for political moderation.188 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id. 
 181. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 861 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 182. See supra TABLE 3 (showing that although Democrats made up a little less than half the voting 
population, they secured less than a quarter of the total available seats). 
 183. See supra TABLE 2. 
 184. See, e.g., Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
 185. LEGIS. & CONG. REAPPORTIONMENT OFF., GA. HOUSE DISTRICT MAP (2015), 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Joint/reapportionment/Documents/2015/House15-PACKET.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/97FV-5CJF]. 
 186. See Overview of State House District 111, Georgia, STATISTICALATLAS.COM, 
https://statisticalatlas.com/state-lower-legislative-district/Georgia/State-House-District-111/Overview 
[https://perma.cc/N4V5-C8JC] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) [hereinafter District 111]. 
 187. See GA. HOUSE DISTRICT MAP, supra note 185. 
 188. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 879–84 (showing that both Georgia’s 
congressional and state house plans largely favored Democrats in the late twentieth century and 
currently favor Republicans). 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/7
2019] PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 519 
Georgia currently boasts strong Republican support from everywhere 
but a few metropolitan areas, namely around metro Atlanta.189 An 
easy contention is that Georgia naturally favors Republicans more 
than Democrats, no matter how districts are arranged.190 However, as 
the plaintiffs argued in Whitford v. Gill,191 a plausible counter is that 
even if Georgia is naturally pro-Republican, there is no evidence 
strong enough to account for the plan’s large EG. The success of this 
counterargument hinges on other evidence supporting the plan’s 
discriminatory intent and effect: evidence that is currently 
unavailable. 
It is also important to remember that adherence to traditional 
districting criteria does not necessarily ensure a plan’s 
constitutionality.192 Further proof, such as evidence that this plan has 
the least partisan bias of other considered plans or evidence that the 
plan is necessary to account for large population shifts among the 
affected districts, is required to justify the Bill’s effects. 
Based on this analysis, Georgia House Bill 566’s redistricting plan 
meets all required elements of the standard and violates Georgia 
Democratic voters’ rights afforded under the Constitution. It is, 
therefore, necessary to find a solution to this problem. 
III.   Proposal 
The solution to Georgia’s excessively gerrymandered districts is 
simple enough in theory: the state legislature needs to adopt a new 
plan that is less skewed toward one party.193 This plan does not need 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See 2016 Georgia Presidential Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-
election/results/map/president/georgia/ [https://perma.cc/Y94V-SLU2] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
 190. See Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1282 (N.D. Ga. 
2017); see also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 912 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 
(2018) (“The defendants’ primary argument is that Wisconsin’s political geography naturally favors 
Republicans because Democratic voters reside in more geographically concentrated areas, particularly in 
urban centers like Milwaukee and Madison.”). 
 191. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884, 912. 
 192. Id. at 888, 912 (recognizing that “compliance with traditional districting principles [does not] 
necessarily create[] a constitutional ‘safe harbor’ for state legislatures”). 
 193. See id. at 911–12 (arguing that alternative maps created by legislature will “achieve[] the 
legislature’s valid districting goals while generating a substantially smaller partisan advantage” than Act 
43). 
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to overcompensate by giving the Democratic Party an unequal 
political advantage, nor does it need to result in complete partisan 
fairness. In fact, it ought not do either because, as discussed 
earlier,194 a one-to-one voting ratio is not constitutionally required 
and would be hard, if not impossible, to achieve.195 Instead, the 
controlling party can still experience some advantage over the other 
party, but the state legislature should minimize this advantage as 
much as possible to reduce the ineffectiveness of the minority party’s 
voting power.196 Though simple in theory, the solution’s 
implementation, without judicial intervention, may prove more 
challenging.197 
A.   The Trouble with Judicial Remedies 
The current solution to a plan that infringes on citizens’ voting 
rights is to resolve it in court.198 This is a viable option of last resort, 
and it has never succeeded and cannot do so without both parties 
expending substantial time and effort in litigation.199 Nevertheless, if 
a discriminated party does make a successful claim against an 
ultimately unconstitutional Georgia plan, the appropriate remedy is 
for the court to enter an injunction barring the use of the plan in 
future elections.200 The burden of creating a remedial districting plan, 
however, will still rest on Georgia’s legislature, and the legislature 
must have a reasonable opportunity to adopt a constitutional plan.201 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See supra Part I. 
 195. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131 (1986) (finding that statewide votes in proportion to 
statewide representation is not required by the Constitution). 
 196. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 911–12. 
 197. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy 
agreed that “[a] decision ordering the correction of all election district lines drawn for partisan reasons 
would commit federal and state courts to unprecedented intervention in the American political process.” 
Id. 
 198. See Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 
27, 2017). 
 199. E.g., Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1283 (N.D. Ga. 
2017) (“The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on partisan gerrymandering teaches us that the Court could 
rule in a variety of different ways on [gerrymandering] issues . . . including not ruling on them at all.”). 
 200. Whitford, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at *2 (“The parties agree that the appropriate remedy in 
this case is to enter an injunction prohibiting the use of Act 43’s districting plan in future elections.”). 
 201. Id. at *2–3. 
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The courts are not an effective enough body to devise a state district 
plan, not only because of constitutional fears of breaching separation 
of powers principles but also because the state is a better institution 
for “reconcil[ing] traditional state policies within the constitutionally 
mandated framework of substantial population equality.”202 No entity 
other than Georgia’s legislature knows better the unique 
characteristics and underpinnings of Georgia’s population.203 Thus, 
the legislature also knows how best to cater to those qualities while 
conforming to constitutional voting standards. 
Unlike plans enacted by the state legislature on its own accord, 
instances where courts force a plan on the state risk excessive judicial 
intervention that disrupts the state’s legislative process.204 Opponents 
of the EG warn that if the judiciary is left responsible for correcting 
all unconstitutional districting plans, the standard will open courts to 
a tremendous volume of gerrymandering claims, clogging up courts 
with meritless suits and making the judicial system ineffective.205 
However, these fears are misplaced. Upholding the Constitution 
and enforcing violations of it cannot be weighed against the 
inconvenience of doing so.206 Although the states have power over 
their own interests, this power does not insulate them when used to 
“circumvent[] a federally protected right.”207 The emergence of a 
manageable standard like the one in Whitford v. Gill also reduces the 
complexity of litigating and deciding gerrymandering cases, 
imposing less burdens on courts than past gerrymandering cases.208 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Id. at *4 (quoting Gorin v. Karpan, 755 F. Supp. 1430, 1445–46 (D. Wyo. 1991)) (“This very 
basic principle is grounded not only on the constitutional limitations of federal authority but also on the 
practical reality that it is the state legislature, not the federal court, that is ‘the best institution “to 
identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of 
substantial population equality.”‘”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Brief for Appellants, supra note 148, at 2 (“Whenever a politically minded body draws electoral 
boundaries . . . any displeased voter in the State (even one living in a district not altered by the new 
map) can file a lawsuit in federal court seeking invalidation of the entire map.”). 
 205. Id. at 2. Under the EG, “one out of every three legislative maps over the last [forty-five] years 
would have had too much partisan effect.” Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 206. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). 
 207. Id. 
 208. G. Michael Parsons, The Institutional Case for Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 2017 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 155, 157 (2017). 
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Furthermore, though state legislators may instinctively want to nudge 
district lines one way or the other to better serve their own party, not 
every instance of this will result in court action. 
In addition to certain levels of partisanship being common and 
almost unavoidable in districting maps, potential plaintiffs will find it 
hard to establish the legislators’ discriminatory intent if the map only 
makes minor changes to district lines.209 Similarly, proving such a 
plan’s discriminatory effect will be equally challenging because it is 
likely too minute to account for any substantial diminishment in 
voting power.210 It is important to reiterate that it should not be the 
courts’ primary responsibility to determine when a plan is 
unconstitutional. While established redistricting standards make 
judicial intervention easier, it is the state’s responsibility to 
implement a plan that does not require judicial oversight. 
B.   A Legislative Solution 
With the clear limits imposed on partisan gerrymandering by the 
intent-and-effect standard, the first line of defense in protecting 
constitutional voting rights rests with individual state legislatures.211 
The power to enact redistricting plans undisputedly belongs to the 
states, and, in light of the current legal tests for determining 
unconstitutionally gerrymandered districts, it is the states’ 
prerogative to pass plans that will result in the least amount of 
political and judicial resistance.212 Therefore, enacting district maps 
that are constitutional to begin with will avoid future costs of 
litigation and public backlash resulting from constitutional issues.213 
In Georgia’s situation, a legislative solution would call for the 
immediate passage of a new district map that will correct the lines 
drawn by House Bill 566. Though difficult, it is possible for a new 
                                                                                                                 
 209. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 332 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[P]olitical considerations 
may properly influence the decisions of our elected officials.”); Parsons, supra note 208, at 176. 
 210. Parsons, supra note 208, at 176. 
 211. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 
(2018) 
 212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 883–84. 
 213. See Weiss, supra note 10, at 696. 
36
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/7
2019] PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 523 
plan to have a statewide view and ensure all 180 of Georgia’s house 
districts conform to the standards set out above, as well as the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gill v. Whitford.214 In fact, Georgia and 
every other state will have to enact such a map with the 2020 census 
approaching.215 In the interim, however, the more pertinent issues a 
new plan must address are the seventeen districts affected by House 
Bill 566 and Districts 105 and 111 in particular.216 
The first step in rectifying Georgia’s district lines is to have a more 
inclusive drafting process. Conducting secret drafting meetings and 
omitting entire political parties from those meetings will likely result 
in maps drawn that heavily disfavor the excluded party and will also 
add to the appearance of discriminatory intent if the map is 
challenged.217 If Democratic representatives—the party excluded 
from drafting meetings for House Bill 566218—are included in the 
drafting process, the resulting map may not give each party equal 
representational power, but it will yield districts that lean more 
toward political fairness compared to one created wholly by 
Republicans.219 Similarly, more political fairness will likely result if 
all Georgia residents are also allowed to publicly comment on the 
proposed plan prior to its enactment and if those comments are 
seriously considered rather than ignored.220 If political fairness 
concerns are addressed and resolved before a plan leaves the drafting 
room, public outrage, like what followed the proposed redistricting 
plan in 2017, would be eliminated.221 
                                                                                                                 
 214. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at *17–18. 
 215. Parsons, supra note 208, at 176. 
 216. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
 217. Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1271 (N.D. Ga. filed 
Aug. 25, 2017); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 894. 
 218. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271. 
 219. Cf. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 865. While discussing the problem faced in 
apportioning voter share in uncontested races, Stephanopoulos and McGhee point at the only certainties 
in that scenario is that those races’ “outcome[s] would have been different had [they] been contested.” 
Id. 
 220. Cf. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271. “[M]inority residents of Georgia were denied any 
opportunity for public comment on the measure” that is the subject of the suit. Id. 
 221. See, e.g., Aaron Gould Sheinin, Democrats Cry Foul as House Republicans Redraw District 
Lines, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:49 PM), http://www.myajc.com/news/state—regional-
govt—politics/democrats-cry-foul-house-republicans-redraw-district-
lines/sOOXVi3vMCWJCB7gpAntTN/ [https://perma.cc/3JGX-C5WR]; Torpy, supra note 18. 
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Legislative mapmakers also need to work alongside statistical 
experts during the drafting process. Together, they will create many 
different district maps that compose a spectrum of partisanship 
ranging from ones heavily in favor of Republicans to those that 
greatly advantage Democrats.222 As part of developing this 
partisanship range, legislators must vary each map’s EG, shape, 
compactness, divisions of political neighborhoods, and other 
“traditional” factors.223 
On the other hand, Georgia should not set the EG’s 
constitutionality threshold at the eight percent limit suggested by 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee.224 Rather, Georgia legislators must use 
their discretion in adopting a precise threshold mainly due to the 
state’s history of single-party dominance and profound political 
geography that favors one party over the other.225 For example, in the 
1970s and 1980s, the EGs of Georgia’s state house plans were the 
most pro-Democratic not just of any state in the south, which was 
predominately inclined toward Democrats, but of any state in the 
nation.226 During this period, Georgia’s EGs consistently exceeded 
the eight percent threshold, landing instead in the fourteen to sixteen 
percent range.227 Since 1980, each successive Georgia plan has 
reflected a stronger Republican preference, eventually shifting to a 
Republican EG greater than six percent in 2012.228 Averaging some 
of the highest EGs on both ends of the spectrum, Georgia’s threshold 
ought to be raised to ten percent to account for the state’s trend in 
extreme political favoritism. This specific threshold number is, of 
course, merely a suggestion. Georgia’s legislature is free to follow 
                                                                                                                 
 222. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 889–90. 
 223. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 347–50 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 224. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 888. 
 225. See id. at 879–84. 
 226. See id. at 882–84. Georgia’s state house plans in the 1970s were some of the most pro-
Democratic EGs, second only to South Carolina, and, throughout the 1980s, they exhibited the most 
pro-Democratic EGs of any state. Id. 
 227. See id. at 883–84, 889. 
 228. Id. at 882–83 (showing that each successive decennial districting plan since the 1980s has 
trended towards higher Republican EGs). See supra TABLE 5 (showing the EG under the 2012 plan to be 
6.345%). 
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any limit it wishes, so long as it is reasonable and does not conflict 
with any threshold imposed by the Supreme Court.229 
Mapmakers must also avoid creating districts that are facially 
susceptible to unconstitutional gerrymandering claims. Unlike the 
revised District 111 under House Bill 566—the district most facially 
gerrymandered—districts devised under this revamped drafting 
process should maintain boundaries that are not highly unusual in 
shape and should not cut across political neighborhoods and towns.230 
A good example of this are the districts created in and around 
Atlanta. In counties like Fulton, DeKalb, Henry, and Clayton, 
residents predominately vote for Democrats.231 Accordingly, house 
lines must largely stick to pre-established borders and avoid mixing 
Democratic metro areas with more Republican suburbs232 to decrease 
the likelihood of packing and cracking. Although this method is 
similar to the one used in drafting Wisconsin’s Act 43, the difference 
is that both parties will participate in drafting so that, unlike Act 43, 
the map ultimately enacted will be more politically competitive and 
give a significantly smaller partisan advantage to one party.233 
Conforming to drafting guidelines like these promotes political 
transparency and fairness that does not necessitate one political party 
completely ceding to the other, but instead gives Georgia legislators 
“a comprehensible field map to stay out of court.”234 A renewed 
drafting process will also eliminate legislators’ focus on creating 
districts that secure their re-elections, thus allowing their concerns to 
shift to issues of preserving communities that actually share political 
interests, as well as achieving districts that best maximize 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 890–91. 
 230. See also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 888, 912 (W.D. Wis. 2016) , vacated, 138 S. Ct. 
1916 (2018). For a better visual of the unusual and salamander-like shape of District 111, see District 
111, supra note 186. 
 231. 2016 Georgia Presidential Election Results, supra note 189. 
 232. See General Election 2016, supra note 112; General Election 2014, supra note 161; General 
Election 2012, supra note 161. Election data show that democratic candidates in districts surrounding 
metro-Atlanta historically run unopposed and that republican candidates in suburbs like Alpharetta are 
similarly uncontested. General Election 2016, supra note 112; General Election 2014, supra note 161; 
General Election 2012, supra note 161. 
 233. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 911–12. 
 234. Parsons, supra note 208, at 177. 
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communities’ political influence.235 The Georgia legislature should 
adopt internal procedures like the ones suggested here that ensure 
substantial partisan advantage is not a factor in district mapmaking. 
CONCLUSION 
Excessive partisan gerrymandering is increasingly more prominent 
in state redistricting plans. Legislators have abused their majority 
control of state governments to the point where citizens’ 
constitutional voting rights are infringed and severely handicapped 
by plans that discriminate against voters because of political 
affiliations.236 Though a certain level of partisan gerrymandering is 
tolerable and unavoidable, the extent to which it is involved in 
current political processes ignores basic constitutional rights.237 After 
decades of the Supreme Court rejecting unconstitutional 
gerrymandering claims, a justiciable standard has emerged with the 
Efficiency Gap.238 This half-political, half-statistical measure works 
in conjunction with a three-step standard: evidence of a plan’s 
discriminatory intent, effect, and lack of justification.239 The result is 
a legal test that determines when a plan is unconstitutional and also 
addresses the Supreme Court’s concerns with past tests.240 
Applying this test, Georgia’s 2015 redistricting plan is likely 
unconstitutional. This results from the Republican-controlled 
legislature’s intent to weaken Democratic voting powers and an 
Efficiency Gap so high it nearly doubles the threshold proposed by 
the measure’s creators. Additionally, unusual districts that splice 
political communities and a lack of legitimate legislative justification 
in designing these districts also contribute to the plan’s 
unconstitutionality. However, Georgia can take steps to prevent this 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1271 (N.D. Ga. filed 
Aug. 25, 2017); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 898–99. 
 237. Parsons, supra note 208, at 176. 
 238. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 399 (2006); Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287–88, 293 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 116 (1986). 
 239. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
 240. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 848–49. 
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unconstitutionality by enacting a remedial plan that conforms to this 
new legal standard and by being more inclusive and transparent in 
future redistricting decisions. 
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